By Kari Lipschutz , World Politics Review
WPR: What is the nature of the airspace dispute between the two countries?
Petros Vamvakas: The airspace dispute is one component of a more complex quarrel between neighbors. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas (UNCLOS) favors Greece, an archipelagic state, since extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would effectively result in 90 percent of the Aegean being defined as Greek territorial waters, along with the corresponding airspace. Due to its relative strength and lack of islands, Turkey favors a political solution, even if this position challenges prevailing international law. In 1995, the Turkish parliament declared that an extension by Greece of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles from the current six would be considered an act of war — “casus belli” — even though Turkey has extended its territorial waters outside the Aegean to 12 nautical miles. Furthermore, even though Turkey recognizes Greece’s Flight Information Region (FIR) jurisdiction over civilian flights, it refuses to acknowledge Greek authority over military flights, as is the norm in similar situations. Instead, Turkey consistently refuses to submit military flight plans to Athens in an attempt to avoid the de facto implementation of international law, a refusal that Greece considers a violation of airspace.
WPR: Have there been any meaningful attempts to resolve it?
Vamvakas: There have been several attempts to solve the Aegean dispute, as the issue has become increasingly complicated, and Greece and Turkey have reached the brink of conflict on several occasions. The first two attempts at resolution followed episodes that brought the two neighbors to the brink of an open conflict in 1987 and 1996, while the third and more meaningful attempt came within the framework of Turkey’s application for accession to the European Union. As part of the 1999 EU Helsinki summit agreement, Turkey agreed to solve all bilateral disputes with Greece in order to begin membership negotiations with the EU. However, changes in administration in Turkey in 2002 and in Greece in 2004 led to a new impasse, as the EU-Turkey relationship became increasingly troubled.
WPR: To what extent does it represent a real risk for conflict?
Vamvakas: The possibilities for conflict are very real for a variety of political, military and economic reasons. As long as Turkey maintains its de facto challenges to Greece’s airspace jurisdiction — by proclaiming “grey zones” of sovereignty over a number of islands — and to Athens’ FIR over military flights, while also continuing its casus belli posturing, the risk of conflict is real. But even though the risk of conflict is very real, the possibility of conflict remains distant, since interest groups within each country are either committed to ending this dispute, or else would like to limit it to remaining a low-intensity conflict in order to promote a domestic political agenda. It is overwhelmingly understood on both sides of the Aegean that a hot conflict would be suicidal.
