Germany’s response to the crisis involving fellow EU member Greece and Turkey has put a spotlight on the complex relationship between Berlin and Ankara, says CATHRIN SCHAER.
The German chancellor has been called a lot of names over the years. Germans often refer to Angela Merkel as ‘Mutti’, or ‘mummy’. The French have been known to call her ‘Angie’. She has also been described as the ‘queen of Europe’, ‘Mrs Nein’, ‘the climate chancellor’ and, more often lately, ‘leader of the free world’.
Soon though, the longstanding German leader may find that another nickname becomes more widely known: ‘the Erdogan whisperer’.
“That is how she is seen here,” says Kristian Brakel, who heads the Istanbul office of the left-leaning Heinrich Böll Foundation. “She is somebody he [Turkish leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan] has to listen to.”
The fact that Erdogan listens to Merkel is about more than the German’s non-threatening diplomatic style. Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian leader pays attention to Germany’s Mutti because of the country’s special relationship with Turkey.
“There is no other country that Turkey has such a relationship with, and on so many different levels,” continues Brakel, who has been heading his foundation’s office in Istanbul for the past five years and observing Turkish affairs for almost 20.
“For Turkey, what is said in Berlin is more relevant than what is said in Brussels. Although,” he cautions, “that [special relationship] is not always taken quite as seriously in Germany as it is here.”
“Our special relationship with Turkey – unequalled in intensity and duration by any other European country – goes back to the beginning of the modern age,” German foreign policy expert, Constanze Stelzenmüller, wrote in an essay. Germany is Turkey’s most important trading partner, the top destination for Turkish exports and, if not for energy deals with Russia, Germany would be Turkey’s biggest importer too.
Trade between the two countries totalled around 35.4 billion euros in 2019, with the trade balance in Germany’s favour to the tune of almost four billion. Germany is also one of the top investors inside Turkey with companies like BASF, Siemens, Volkswagen and Daimler all setting up shop there.
Germany is also home to an estimated four million locals of Turkish descent, thanks to migration that began in the 1960s; that’s the largest Turkish population outside of Turkey.
More recently Germany has played a major role in Turkey’s international affairs, firstly as a prime mover in stalling its attempt to become an official member of the European Union and then, more recently in the forging of the still-controversial immigration deal which sees Turkey – often described as the bridge between Europe and the Middle East – keeping migrants and asylum seekers at bay, at Europe’s outermost borders.
It’s never been an easy relationship and thanks to Turkey’s increasingly assertive – some call it aggressive, others argue that it is defensive – foreign policy, as well as Erdogan’s progressively more authoritarian behaviour after the 2016 coup attempt, it’s getting trickier all the time.
Part of the former includes the tense situation in the eastern Mediterranean, which saw Greek and Turkish ships collide, in the latest in a long, historical line of Greek-Turkish skirmishes. As international relations expert Michaël Tanchum wrote for Foreign Policy magazine recently about the EU’s reaction to this: “The six Mediterranean EU countries are evenly split. Greece, Cyprus, and France advocate strong action against Turkey while Italy, Malta, and Spain – which all share significant commercial interests with Turkey – have refrained. Germany, holding the EU presidency since July, could break the deadlock,” he suggested.
Yet somehow, that isn’t happening – at least, not yet. And it’s really annoying some of the neighbours. “Frau Merkel is an ally of the sultan!,” was the outraged headline in one nationalist Greek publication, Dimokratia.
It was no coincidence that the Turkish provocations were happening just as Germany took over the European council presidency, the article continued.
“If we really had a special relationship with Germany, then the chancellor should have given us her full support against Turkey’s aggressiveness and Islamist expansionism,” op-ed writer, Jean-Loup Bonnamy, complained in French daily, Le Figaro.
“What has counted the most in the [eastern Mediterranean] crisis is Germany’s exceedingly low profile,” François Heisbourg, senior adviser for Europe at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, tweeted. Writing in the Guardian, foreign affairs commentator Simon Tisdall contrasted the EU’s reactions to elections in Belarus and the Mediterranean maritime fracas: “Unlike Belarus, [Turkey] has real strategic importance,” he wrote. “Perhaps that explains the awkward silence of many governments, including the UK’s. It does not excuse it.”
Then again, Germany probably has better excuses than most. “Germany is in a bind here,” the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Brakel says. “It has this influence on Turkey but, because of the multi-faceted relationship it has, it is also much more vulnerable than other EU members and has more to lose.”
